OPEC and OPEC+: The Cartel That Still Moves Markets in a Fragmented World

Enerdealers Editorial

OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and its expanded coalition OPEC+ remain the most influential force in global crude oil markets, collectively accounting for roughly 40% of world production and over half of internationally traded oil. For traders, suppliers, buyers and policymakers, understanding how this bloc operates, who sits inside and outside its ranks, and what levers it pulls to steer prices is essential to navigating energy markets in 2026 and beyond.

A major development in May 2026 – the United Arab Emirates’ exit from OPEC – has reshaped the group’s internal balance and market dynamics, marking the second high‑profile exit in two years after Angola. This article provides a comprehensive overview of OPEC and OPEC+, their membership, goals, strategies, policies and market impact, with particular attention to the implications of the UAE’s departure for decision‑makers in the energy sector.

Origins and Purpose: Why OPEC Was Created

OPEC was founded in Baghdad on 14 September 1960 by five countries: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Its founding statute spelled out a clear mission: to “coordinate and unify petroleum policies” among members, safeguard their interests individually and collectively, secure stable prices for producers, ensure regular supply to consumers, and deliver a fair return on capital for investors.

The context was post‑war oil markets dominated by Western “major” oil companies (the “Seven Sisters”), which could unilaterally cut posted prices and production quotas, eroding producer revenues. OPEC’s early years were modest, but by the 1970s it had become a geopolitical and market power, especially after the 1973 Arab oil embargo and production cuts that sent prices soaring and triggered recessions in the West.

Six decades later, OPEC’s core objectives remain unchanged, but the landscape in which it operates has transformed dramatically. The rise of U.S. shale, the expansion of non‑OPEC offshore production, the energy transition and geopolitical fragmentation have all eroded OPEC’s monopoly‑like power. Yet the cartel’s ability to coordinate supply among a large group of sovereign producers still makes it the single most important organized force in oil markets.

Membership: Who Is In, Who Is Out, and Why It Matters

The most visible change in 2026 is the UAE’s departure in May, following Angola’s exit in late 2023/2024. These departures reflect growing tensions over quota allocations, capacity assessments and burden‑sharing within the cartel.

Current OPEC and OPEC+ Membership (July 2026)

Category	Country	Status	Notes
OPEC Full Members (12)	Algeria	Member	Joined 1969
	Republic of the Congo	Member	Joined 2018
	Equatorial Guinea	Member	Joined 2017
	Gabon	Member	Rejoined 2016
	Iran	Founding Member	Joined 1960
	Iraq	Founding Member	Joined 1960
	Kuwait	Founding Member	Joined 1960
	Libya	Member	Joined 1962
	Nigeria	Member	Joined 1971
	Saudi Arabia	Founding Member	De facto leader
	Venezuela	Founding Member	Joined 1960
	UAE	Left May 2026	Former member; exited over quota disputes
OPEC+ Non‑OPEC Partners	Russia	Core Partner	Second pillar after Saudi Arabia
	Kazakhstan	Core Partner	Part of “core” decision‑making
	Azerbaijan	Partner	Significant Caspian producer
	Oman	Core Partner	Part of “core” decision‑making
	Bahrain	Partner	Participates in some frameworks
	Brunei	Partner	Small but strategic producer
	Malaysia	Partner	Southeast Asian producer
	Sudan	Partner	African producer
	South Sudan	Partner	African producer
	Mexico	Occasional Partner	Participates in coordinated cuts
Former OPEC Members	Angola	Left 2023/2024	Quota disputes
	Qatar	Left 2019	Regional tensions with Saudi Arabia
	Indonesia	Suspended/Inactive	Oscillates between membership
	Ecuador	Left 2020	Economic pressures

Major Non‑OPEC Producers Outside OPEC+

Several of the world’s biggest oil producers are not part of OPEC or OPEC+, which limits the cartel’s ability to fully control global supply:

Country	Production Rank (Global)	Key Characteristics
United States	#1	World’s largest crude producer (~22% of global output in 2023); entirely outside OPEC+; shale flexibility constrains OPEC+ pricing power [bbc]
Canada	#4–5	Major oil sands producer; not in OPEC+; long‑term projects less responsive to price signals [bbc]
Brazil	#8–9	Large and growing offshore pre‑salt producer; not a core OPEC+ member; pursues largely independent policy [bbc]
China	#6	Significant producer but also the largest importer; not in OPEC+; state‑controlled production [bbc]
Norway	#7–8	Major North Sea producer; outside OPEC+; mature basin with declining output [bbc]
India	#20+	Modest producer but major importer; outside OPEC+
Argentina	#15–18	Vaca Muerta shale expansion; outside OPEC+
Guyana	Rising rapidly	Major offshore discoveries; outside OPEC+; fast‑growing exporter
Suriname	Emerging	Offshore discoveries; outside OPEC+
United Kingdom	#20+	North Sea mature basin; outside OPEC+

This fragmentation means OPEC+ can influence but not dictate global prices, especially when non‑OPEC supply responds quickly to price signals. The table above highlights the structural limits of OPEC+’s market power: even with the cartel’s coordination, non‑OPEC producers collectively account for around 60% of global output.

Governance and Decision‑Making

OPEC’s structure is relatively simple but designed to enforce consensus among sovereign states:

• The Conference – the supreme body, composed of delegations (usually oil ministers) from each member. It meets at least twice a year and makes key policy decisions by unanimity (one country, one vote).

• Board of Governors – supervises the Secretariat, reviews reports and budgets.

• Secretariat – based in Vienna, headed by a Secretary‑General, it handles day‑to‑day operations, data collection, market analysis and implementation monitoring.

OPEC+ adds a layer of informal but critical forums:

• Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) – tracks compliance and market conditions.

• Ministerial meetings – sometimes virtual, where the broader OPEC+ group and the “core” members agree on production baselines, voluntary cuts, and compensation mechanisms.

Decisions are often framed as “adjustments” to a reference production level, with voluntary cuts layered on top. Compliance is monitored via third‑party data and self‑reporting, and chronic over‑producers can be pressured to submit compensation plans.

The UAE’s exit has complicated this structure. As a major Gulf producer with ambitious capacity expansion plans, the UAE had been central to OPEC+’s “core” decision‑making. Its departure removes a key voice in setting quotas and weakens the group’s ability to present a unified Gulf position. Market participants now watch more closely for signs of fragmentation among remaining members, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iraq over burden‑sharing.

The UAE’s exit has complicated this structure. As a major Gulf producer with ambitious capacity expansion plans, the UAE had been central to OPEC+’s “core” decision‑making. Its departure removes a key voice in setting quotas and weakens the group’s ability to present a unified Gulf position.

Goals and Strategic Logic

At a high level, OPEC’s goals have remained consistent since 1960:

• Stabilize prices to avoid damaging volatility for both producers and consumers.

• Secure fair and stable revenue for member governments, many of which depend heavily on oil exports for fiscal budgets.

• Ensure regular supply to global markets, avoiding both shortages and gluts.

In practice, OPEC and OPEC+ operate as a swing supplier: they adjust output to balance the market when demand or non‑OPEC supply shifts unexpectedly. When demand weakens (e.g., recessions, pandemic), they cut production to support prices. When demand strengthens or non‑OPEC supply falters, they can release barrels to cap price spikes and protect market share.

For traders, the key concept is spare capacity. Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Kuwait and Iraq, hold significant spare capacity that can be brought online relatively quickly. The UAE’s exit removes a substantial chunk of potential spare capacity from the cartel’s coordinated pool, which may reduce OPEC+’s flexibility in responding to shocks.

Strategically, OPEC+ faces a balancing act:

• Short‑term revenue maximization: Higher prices benefit fiscal budgets in the near term, especially for Gulf states funding diversification projects.

• Long‑term market share: Excessively high prices accelerate substitution (EVs, renewables, efficiency) and invite non‑OPEC supply responses (U.S. shale, Guyana, Brazil).

• Energy transition positioning: OPEC increasingly argues for “investment discipline” in oil and gas to avoid supply shortages that could disrupt the transition, while member states pursue their own diversification strategies (e.g., Saudi Vision 2030).

The UAE’s exit suggests that some members may prioritize independent capacity expansion over coordinated supply management, potentially fragmenting OPEC+’s strategic coherence.

Beyond formal quotas, Saudi Arabia and some allies often announce voluntary additional cuts to tighten the market when they judge prices too low for fiscal needs.

Tools and Policies: How OPEC+ Moves the Market

OPEC+ does not set prices directly; it influences them through production policy. Main instruments include:

1. Aggregate Production Targets and Quotas

OPEC+ agrees on a group‑wide production level and allocates national quotas. In recent years, these have been expressed as adjustments relative to a reference month (e.g., August 2022 or October 2023).

As of late 2025/early 2026, OPEC+ has:

• Extended group‑wide quotas through end‑2026, keeping overall policy continuity.

• Maintained roughly 3.24 million barrels per day (bpd) of total cuts, representing about 3% of global demand.

• Kept voluntary cuts of 1.65 million bpd by the “core” members in place through 2026, with the possibility of gradual restoration subject to market conditions.

In Q1 2026, the core countries paused planned increases, citing seasonal weakness, and kept December 2025 levels. The UAE’s May 2026 exit came after disagreements over how these quotas should be adjusted to reflect its expanded capacity ambitions.

When members exceed quotas, OPEC+ increasingly demands compensation schedules, where over‑produced volumes are “paid back” via deeper future cuts.

2. Voluntary Cuts and “Burden‑Sharing” Politics

Beyond formal quotas, Saudi Arabia and some allies often announce voluntary additional cuts to tighten the market when they judge prices too low for fiscal needs. Examples include Saudi Arabia’s unilateral 1 million bpd cut in mid‑2023 and subsequent coordinated voluntary cuts by the core members.

These voluntary measures are politically sensitive: they require internal agreement on who cuts how much, and they often lead to disputes over compensation for over‑production. The Angola and UAE exits illustrate how quota disputes can escalate into membership losses.

3. Compensation Mechanisms and Compliance Monitoring

When members exceed quotas, OPEC+ increasingly demands compensation schedules, where over‑produced volumes are “paid back” via deeper future cuts. Third‑party agencies (e.g., Degolyer & Macnaughton) are being used to assess maximum sustainable capacity (MSC), which was intended to inform 2027 baselines. The UAE’s departure followed disagreements over how MSC assessments would affect its future quotas.

For traders, compliance rates matter: persistent over‑production by some members can undermine the credibility of cuts and cap price rallies. Market participants closely watch JMMC reports and press statements for hints of fatigue or fractures.

4. Forward Guidance and Market Signalling

OPEC+ statements are carefully worded to guide expectations:

• Language about “monitoring market conditions” and retaining “full flexibility” signals readiness to adjust policy if demand or supply shocks emerge.

• Announcements of upcoming meeting dates (e.g., June 7, 2026 for the next full OPEC+ ministerial) create a calendar of potential volatility.

The market often reacts to the tone as much as the numbers: hints of internal disagreement or unexpected cuts can trigger sharp moves in Brent and WTI. The UAE’s exit added a new layer of uncertainty, with traders reassessing OPEC+’s cohesion and ability to enforce quotas without a key Gulf member.

Research suggests that oil prices would be lower without OPEC, even if its power has waned relative to the 1970s.

Market Impact: Prices, Premia and Risk Management

OPEC+’s influence is clearest in price levels and volatility:

• By controlling a large share of marginal supply, OPEC+ can tilt the balance between surplus and deficit, especially when global inventories are tight.

• During periods of weak demand (e.g., 2020 pandemic, 2023–2025 growth slowdowns), OPEC+ cuts have helped put a floor under prices, preventing a collapse that would have imperiled fiscal budgets in many member states.

• Conversely, when prices surge due to geopolitical shocks (e.g., Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022, Middle East tensions), OPEC+ can release barrels or signal willingness to do so, tempering spikes and protecting long‑term demand.

  
  

The UAE’s exit has several market implications:

• Reduced spare capacity coordination: The UAE had been investing heavily to raise capacity. Its departure means OPEC+ loses a significant source of potential incremental supply that could have been used to manage tight markets.

• Increased fragmentation risk: Two exits in two years (Angola and UAE) signal growing dissatisfaction among members over quota allocations and burden‑sharing, raising the risk of further fractures.

• Price volatility: The announcement of the UAE’s exit in May 2026 triggered short‑term volatility in Brent and WTI as traders reassessed OPEC+’s cohesion and enforcement ability.

Empirically, research suggests that oil prices would be lower without OPEC, even if its power has waned relative to the 1970s. The cartel’s ability to act as a coordinated swing supplier still commands a risk premium in futures markets, especially when spare capacity is perceived as limited or when geopolitical risks threaten key members’ infrastructure.

For traders and risk managers, several OPEC+‑driven dynamics are critical:

• Brent/West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spreads: OPEC+ decisions often affect Atlantic Basin tightness, influencing Brent relative to U.S. benchmarks.

• Term structure and carry: Sustained cuts can tighten near‑term balances, steepening or flattening curves depending on inventory levels and demand expectations.

• Volatility around meeting dates: Options markets price in elevated uncertainty around OPEC+ ministerials and JMMC meetings, with additional volatility around political developments like membership changes.

The rise of renewables, electric vehicles and climate policy poses a strategic challenge to OPEC’s long‑term relevance. Higher oil prices, while beneficial in the short term, can accelerate investment in alternatives and erode future demand.

Internal Dynamics and Constraints

OPEC+ is not a monolith; it is a coalition of sovereign states with divergent fiscal needs, political priorities and production profiles.

• Fiscal break‑even prices vary widely. Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states need higher oil prices to fund ambitious spending plans and diversification projects, while Russia can tolerate lower prices thanks to different budget structures and reserves.

• Capacity trajectories differ. The UAE had invested heavily to raise capacity and sought higher quotas, leading to the May 2026 exit. Some African members face declining capacity and resist cuts. This tension led to the adoption of an MSC mechanism to set 2027 baselines more objectively.

• Geopolitics intrude. Sanctions on Iran and Venezuela limit their ability to produce and export at full capacity, effectively removing barrels from the market even if quotas exist. Meanwhile, Russia’s war in Ukraine and Western price caps have reshaped trade flows and complicated OPEC+ coordination.

These frictions mean OPEC+ decisions are often compromises, and enforcement relies more on peer pressure and shared interest than on hard rules. The UAE’s departure underscores how capacity ambitions and quota disputes can override collective interests.

The Energy Transition and Long‑Term Strategy

The rise of renewables, electric vehicles and climate policy poses a strategic challenge to OPEC’s long‑term relevance. Higher oil prices, while beneficial in the short term, can accelerate investment in alternatives and erode future demand.

OPEC’s public stance emphasizes:

• Oil’s continued role in the energy mix, especially in developing economies and sectors hard to electrify (aviation, petrochemicals, heavy industry).

• Investment discipline, arguing that under‑investment in oil and gas could lead to supply shortages and price spikes that hurt the global economy and the transition itself.

• Diversification by member states (e.g., Saudi Vision 2030, UAE’s own diversification plans) to reduce reliance on oil revenues over time.

For market participants, the key implication is that OPEC+ may increasingly prioritize price stability and revenue maximization over market share, especially as long‑term demand growth slows. This could mean more frequent use of voluntary cuts and tighter supply management, punctuated by strategic releases to avoid demand destruction. The UAE’s exit suggests that some members may prefer to pursue independent capacity expansion strategies rather than accept coordinated constraints.

In this environment, OPEC+ acts less like a classic monopoly and more like a coordinated swing supplier in a competitive, multi‑polar market. Its power is greatest when inventories are low, non‑OPEC growth is sluggish, and geopolitical risks are elevated.

Non‑OPEC Supply and the Limits of OPEC+ Power

OPEC+’s influence is constrained by non‑OPEC supply responses:

• U.S. shale remains the most flexible non‑OPEC source, able to ramp up or down over months in response to price signals. This caps how high OPEC+ can push prices without losing market share.

• Other offshore and deepwater projects (Brazil, Guyana, Norway) add medium‑term supply that is less responsive but still limits OPEC’s dominance.

• Policy and sanctions can abruptly add or remove barrels (e.g., Iranian and Venezuelan output under sanctions, Russian export constraints under price caps).

In this environment, OPEC+ acts less like a classic monopoly and more like a coordinated swing supplier in a competitive, multi‑polar market. Its power is greatest when inventories are low, non‑OPEC growth is sluggish, and geopolitical risks are elevated. The UAE’s exit reduces OPEC+’s spare capacity buffer, potentially making the group more cautious about aggressive cuts that could invite non‑OPEC competition.

What This Means for Decision‑Makers in the Energy Sector

For traders, suppliers, buyers and policymakers, several takeaways stand out:

• OPEC+ remains a central price‑setter, especially at the margin. Its production decisions and rhetoric should be integral to any oil market model or hedging strategy.

• Membership changes matter. The UAE’s May 2026 exit removes a key Gulf producer from the cartel, reducing spare capacity coordination and raising fragmentation risks. Monitor for further exits or policy divergences.

• Compliance and internal politics matter. Watch for signs of disagreement over quotas, compensation plans, and capacity assessments; these can foreshadow policy shifts or breakdowns.

• The “core” members are the real drivers. Saudi Arabia and Russia are the twin pillars; Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman provide critical support. Their joint statements carry more weight than broad OPEC+ communiqués.

• Energy transition risks are real but gradual. OPEC+ is likely to manage supply to maximize revenue over the next decade, even as long‑term demand growth slows. Expect continued use of voluntary cuts and flexible policy.

• Non‑OPEC supply sets the ceiling. U.S. shale and other flexible sources limit how far OPEC+ can push prices without inviting substitution and demand erosion.

Practical Implications for Different Stakeholders

Traders: Incorporate OPEC+ meeting calendars, compliance data and membership developments into volatility models. Options markets will continue to price in elevated uncertainty around ministerials, with additional spikes around political shocks like exits or sanctions.

Suppliers and Service Companies: The UAE’s exit signals that some producers may prioritize capacity expansion over coordination. This could create opportunities in markets where OPEC+ members pursue independent investment programs, but also raises the risk of oversupply if multiple members follow suit.

Buyers and Refiners: Diversify supply sources beyond OPEC+ where possible to mitigate concentration risk. The cartel’s fragmentation increases the likelihood of supply disruptions from individual members pursuing independent policies.

Policymakers: Monitor OPEC+ cohesion as an indicator of geopolitical stability in key producing regions. Fragmentation within the cartel could lead to more volatile prices, complicating energy security planning.

Conclusion: A Cartel in Transition

OPEC and OPEC+ are not the all‑powerful cartel of the 1970s, but they remain the most important organized force in global oil markets. The UAE’s 2026 exit marks a significant shift, reducing the group’s cohesion and spare capacity coordination. Yet the fundamental logic of OPEC+ endures: a large group of sovereign producers with shared interests in price stability can still tilt global balances when they act in concert.

For decision‑makers in the energy sector, the lesson is clear: OPEC+ cannot be ignored, but it cannot be relied upon as a monolithic actor. Its internal fractures, membership changes and strategic dilemmas in the face of the energy transition make it a more complex and unpredictable force than in previous decades. Understanding its structure, incentives and constraints is as essential as tracking inventories, refinery runs and macro data for anyone navigating oil markets in 2026 and beyond.

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Sources

General OPEC and OPEC+ Information

1. OPEC – WikipediaComprehensive overview of OPEC’s history, membership, structure and objectives: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPEC

2. OPEC Secretariat – Official X (Twitter) AccountOfficial communications and updates from the OPEC Secretariat: https://x.com/OPECSecretariat?lang=es

3. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) – “What is OPEC+ and how is it different from OPEC?” Clear explanation of the distinction between OPEC and OPEC+, with production data: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61102

4. Council on Foreign Relations – “OPEC in a Changing World”In‑depth analysis of OPEC’s evolving role in global energy markets: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/opec-changing-world

5. OANDA – “What is OPEC?: A beginner’s guide”Accessible explanation of OPEC’s structure, membership and market role: https://www.oanda.com/bvi-en/lab-education/trading-knowledge/technical-analysis/opec-role-crude-oil-prices/

6. World Economic Forum – “Explainer: What is OPEC?” Concise summary of OPEC’s purpose and influence: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/11/oil-opec-energy-price/

UAE Exit from OPEC/OPEC+ (May 2026)

7. Reuters – “UAE leaves OPEC in blow to global oil producers’ group” (28 April 2026) Detailed report on the UAE’s announcement, timing and market impact: https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/uae-says-it-quits-opec-opec-statement-2026-04-28/

8. Enerdata – “The UAE announces exit from OPEC effective 1 May 2026 after 59 years” (29 April 2026) Analysis of the UAE’s strategic rationale and production context: https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/uae-announces-exit-opec-effective-1-may-2026-after-59-years.html

9. Gulf News – “UAE to Exit OPEC in 2026: Officials and Experts Explain Reasons Behind…” (27 April 2026) Local perspective with quotes from UAE officials and industry experts: https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/why-did-uae-decide-to-exit-opecgovernment-officials-industry-experts-reveal-reasons-behind-decision-1.172234567 (link representative; exact URL may vary)

10. CNBC – “United Arab Emirates leaving OPEC, effective May 1” (28 April 2026) Interview with UAE Energy Minister Suhail Al Mazrouei and market reaction: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/28/uae-opec-oil-iran.html

11. Al Jazeera Opinion – “The UAE’s OPEC exit is not about oil; it is the end of Gulf solidarity” (29 April 2026) Geopolitical analysis of the UAE–Saudi Arabia rift underlying the exit: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/4/29/the-uaes-opec-exit-is-not-about-oil-it-is-the-end-of-gulf-solidarity

12. LinkedIn Post by Alessandro Bazzoni – “UAE to Leave OPEC in May 2026 for Greater Production Flexibility” (27 April 2026) Professional summary of key reasons and market implications: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/alessandro-bazzoni_the-united-arab-emirates-uae-announced-activity-7454935430174498816-IgkK

OPEC+ Production Policy and Market Impact (2025–2026)

13. TASS – “OPEC+ agrees to keep production quotas for Q1 2026” (29 November 2025) Report on OPEC+ decision to maintain quotas into 2026: https://tass.com/economy/2051263

14. Interfax – “OPEC+ extend production quotas for all of 2026, voluntary…” (4 December 2024) Details on quota extensions and voluntary cuts through 2026: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/108331/

15. CNBC – “OPEC+ holds 2026 group‑wide oil output steady, agrees capacity mechanism” (30 November 2025) Coverage of the capacity assessment mechanism for 2027 baselines: https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/30/opec-holds-2026-group-wide-oil-output-steady-agrees-capacity-mechanism.html

16. Vietnam News Agency – “OPEC+ agrees to keep crude oil production unchanged until end of December 2026” (30 November 2025) International wire report on the November 2025 ministerial outcome: https://www.vietnam.vn/en/opec-nhat-tri-giu-nguyen-muc-san-luong-dau-tho-den-het-thang-12-2026

17. EIA – “EIA forecasts lower oil price in 2025 amid significant market…” (25 March 2026) U.S. government outlook on oil supply, demand and prices: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64305

Oil Market Reports and Data

18. International Energy Agency (IEA) – Oil Market Report (December 2024)In‑depth analysis of global oil supply, demand, stocks and prices: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/209af090-8713-42b6-ac5b-650c6e68bccc/-12DEC2024_OilMarketReport.pdf

19. IEA – Oil Market Report (April 2026, free version) Latest available IEA market assessment at time of writing: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/515f3128-df1a-4d6c-beb4-fd91d2434bef/-14APR2026_OilMarketReport_Free_version1.pdf

Additional Context and Analysis

20. Britannica – “OPEC | Membership, Oil, Organization, History, Headquarters, & Facts”Reference entry on OPEC’s founding, membership and evolution: https://www.britannica.com/money/OPEC

21. Federal Reserve Working Paper – “Reasons Behind Words: OPEC Narratives and the Oil Market” (2024) Academic analysis of how OPEC communication affects oil prices: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2024003pap.pdf

22. ECB Working Paper – “Strategic interactions and price dynamics in the global oil market”Research on OPEC’s strategic behavior and market impact: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2368~bcb977be95.en.pdf